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Punitive Behavior in eBay
Auctions
Kyle Gibson, M.A.
Abstract: EBay employs a system known as "feedback" to assure trust
between those buying and selling items using its service. Feedback
information on past auctions is available for all to see; a positive
reputation is likely to increase a seller's business just as a negative
reputation can harm it. The importance of a good eBay reputation
(i.e., highfeedback score) may lead members of the eBay community to
react harshly if they receive neutral or negative feedback. Here, the
hypothesis that negative feedback is reciprocated/punished with
negative feedback is supported The feedback system eBay uses does
not serve the best interests of eBay members - it is simply not the most
honest system possible. A more honest system would incorporate blind
feedback in order to sidestep the inclination of some members to punish
on principle alone.

Introduction and Background
Certain areas of the human psyche have been forged by
natural selection to recognize, remember, and repay treatment judged as
"unfair" (Axlerod 1984; Boyd 1992; Ostrom 2000; Hamilton 1963;
Ridley 1996). Philosophers from Plato to Hobbes and Marx have
contemplated this fact and, with it, the cultural institutions humans
create to regulate and arbitrate "unfair" social transactions. EBay uses
one such regulatory system in order to ensure honest, fair, and legal
business practices are employed by its members; this system is known
as "feedback."
The feedback system works as follows (Modell): after an
auction ends, buyers and sellers leave feedback for each other based on
their shared auction experience. These ratings can be positive, neutral,
or negative. The majority of eBay auctions transpire without any real
problems and both the buyer and seller earn posjtive feedback from one
another. However, sometimes an item or payment takes too long to
arrive, does not arrive at all, or the auction is perceived negatively for
some other reason. Negative feedback is reserved for these instances.
Neutral feedback is meant to cover the remaining transactions but is, in
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practice, quite rare. Of the 60 auctions reviewed for this paper, none
involved neutral feedback.
The feedback system is public and therefore gives buyers and
sellers a concept of whom they might be doing business with before
they are forced to enter into a transaction. Feedback can be left by
either party at any time following an auction. The discrepancy in the
time at which feedback is left seems to playa role in determining what
feedback score is reciprocated (negative, neutral, or positive). This
interaction between feedback position and score is of primary interest
here.
Modell: The eBay Feedback System

EBay feedback transpires much like an ultimatum game. A
single-sided ultimatum game works as follows. One person is given an
easily divided item, often cash, and told they must divide it between
themselves and an unknown "receiver." The receiver sees this offer
and can either accept or reject it. If the offer is accepted, both players
keep the money, if it is rejected; neither of them keeps any money
(Fehr 2003; Henrich 2000; Ridley 1996).
Classical, rational, economic theory dictates that "givers"
should always give the smallest amount of money possible and
receivers should accept any offer, no matter how small, because they
both leave the game with more than they began with. The game,
In "real world"
however, rarely follows this "rational" path.
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experiments, givers are more apt to offer around half of their money to
receivers, who are likely to accept offers within this 50% range (Fehr
2003). If, on the other hand, the offer falls below 20%, the receiver
rejects it so both participants walk away empty-handed (Fehr 2003).
The ultimatum game demonstrates that people would rather punish
someone trying to take more than their "share" than to have any of it
themselves.
Here, I will test the hypothesis that receiving negative
feedback first makes auction participants more likely to leave negative
feedback for the person who left it for them, regardless of what
transpired during the actual auction.
The theoretical literature on game theory, altruism, and
punitive behavior is voluminous. Rather than attempt to cover it all,
this section will focus only on several recent articles that deal directly
with the phenomenon of social punishment. Background on specific
game-theoretical models can be found in numerous other works (see
Ridley 1996 for an excellent overview).
As a company and a community, eBay is highly dependent on
the reliability, accuracy, and honesty of the feedback system. EBay
encourages repeat buying and selling - some people even make their
living auctioning goods on eBay. The high likelihood of repeat
interaction and the use of public reputations (feedback) regulates eBay
interactions. Buyers and sellers must conduct business "by the book" if
they wish to maintain an honorable reputation and remain a member of
the community.
Ernst Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) detail the
importance of such a reputation in social interaction. They show that
the prospect of gaining a reputation increases the likelihood of
cooperative behavior among individuals by more than 35%. The
number is even higher if the actors believe they will interact with each
other again in the future (Engelmann 2002 in Fehr & Fischbacher
2003). For people who use eBay repeatedly, a good reputation can
mean the difference between getting a sale or a deal and getting put out
of business.
There are of course, instances where auctions do not go well
and negative feedback is merited. This may happen for a variety of
reasons, but it is often due to slow shipping or the item arriving
differently than described. There are other instances where negative
feedback appears to be left only to punish people. In a relatively recent
article on punishment, Price et al. (2002) propose the almost
tautological notion that punishment evolved as a mechanism to quell
freeriding. They demonstrate empirically that punishment is employed
not to increase the punisher's wellbeing but to decrease the freerider's
(Price 2002: 179). In other words, people often punish others at their
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own expense. The punishers identified by Price et al. could be defmed
as strong reciprocators. Strong reciprocators are individuals who are
acutely aware and defensive of local social norms (Gintis, 2000).
When a freerider attempts to violate local norms, strong reciprocators
put an end to their behavior regardless of the costs they incur
themselves (Gintis 2000). If, as I have hypothesized, leaving negative
feedback ensures negative feedback will be reciprocated, it may be the
case that the e8ay community is populated by a high proportion of
strong reciprocators, or that the e8ay community fosters "strong"
behavior among its members.
Hypothesis and Methods

The alternative hypothesis being tested here proposes that in a
real-world setting (e8ay), people will act in a way that is concurrent
with the predictions of strong reciprocity described above. That is,
people will punish others even if there is no direct benefit to doing so.
A total of 60 e8ay auctions were selected at for consideration
in this study. Randomization was insured by the following selection
process. First, a random word was selected from a dictionary (e.g.,
"dog"), the word "dog" was then typed into the search field located on
e8ay's homepage (www.ebay.com). The search then returned a list of
auctions containing the word "dog" in their title. From this list, the last
auction on the page was selected. This brought up a live, ongoing
auction for the dog-related item. The most recent negative transaction
of the person selling this item was chosen for analysis. Information
concerning several areas was collected for each of these negative
transactions: a) the feedback score left by the buyer and seller, b) the
positions in which scores were left, and c) the self-reported reasons
given by each participant for leaving such a score, and d) the
cumulative scores of both individuals. SPSS was used to test the
alternate hypothesis and to discern the primary motivations cited for
leaving negative feedback.
Results

The results of a 2 x 2 chi-square test show the significant and
dramatic effects of relative position on feedback (refer to Graph I).
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Graph 1: Feedback Score Left x Position Left
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In auctions involving negative feedback, when participants left positive
feedback first, negative feedback was returned to them 57% of the time.
When participants left negative feedback first, negative feedback was
returned 100% of the time. This difference is statistically significant
(p=.OOl, X2 =11.679, df=l, n=24). In these cases, participants made no
bones about why they chose to respond negatively to those who left
them a negative score - in 46.2% of negative feedback cases, "left
negative feedback for me" was cited as the reason for doing so.
Discussion
For eBay participants, leaving negative feedback for someone
in the first position guarantees the reception of negative feedback in
retaliation. This is less than optimal for the eBay community. In a
truly "honest" system, it would not matter what buyers and sellers say
about one another. It is perfectly feasible that a seller could be happy
about a transaction because he received payment quickly. He should
therefore give the buyer positive feedback for prompt payment. If, say,
the item then takes an unsatisfactorily long time to arrive at the buyer's
home because of an error or laziness on the part of the seller, the buyer
should leave negative feedback so that others do not suffer the same
inconvenience. In reality, this sort of mixed feedback transaction is
rare because strong reciprocators are enforcing norms that run counter
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to eBay's wishes. This may be because the reputation garnered on
eBay is not likely to affect the way someone is treated outside of the
eBay community. The relatively socially isolated world of eBay buyers
and sellers encourages each side to try to strong arm the other into
leaving positive feedback regardless of the circumstances.
It is unlikely that there is a way to extend a person's eBay
reputation in to the world outside of the internet or to simply persuade
the entire eBay community to be more liberal in their use of negative
and neutral feedback (who in their right mind would want to go first?).
A better way to encourage a more honest system may be to give blind
feedback. Blind feedback would take away the ability of one person to
punish another because of actions made outside the realm of the
transaction itself. Additionally, it would provide a more honest
representation of eBay members' trustworthiness.
Conclusion

The hypothesis that negative feedback is reciprocated with
negative feedback regardless of what actually transpires during an eBay
auction was supported. The feedback system employed by eBay does
not serve the best interests of eBay members because it is not the most
honest system possible. A more honest system would incorporate blind
feedback in order to sidestep the inclination of some to punish on
principle alone.
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